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FEATURE COMMENT: The U.S.-MexicoCanada Agreement (USMCA): Some
Surprising Outcomes In Procurement
The Trump administration recently released the
proposed text of the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), a major regional trade agreement
that, if ratified, would replace the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). While the government procurement chapter of the proposed USMCA
was largely a copy-and-paste from the abandoned
Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement (TPP), the
procurement chapter of the USMCA did contain
a few major surprises—including the omission of
Canada. This article reviews the background to the
USMCA, some of the most important elements of
the agreement, and the lessons learned for future
international cooperation in procurement policy
and law.
Background—The U.S.’ commitment to open
international trade can be traced back to the time of
the republic’s founding, when in 1776 Adam Smith
published The Wealth of Nations. Smith argued
that the mercantilist, protectionist policies which
guided Britain were short-sighted, and that nations
instead should acknowledge other nations’ comparative advantages and open trading channels to
foster mutual prosperity. In time, arguments such
as Smith’s in favor of free trade became a cornerstone of Western economic policy.
That commitment to free trade ebbed
badly during the Depression, when economic pressures brought the U.S. and other Western nations
to embrace protectionism. The Buy American Act
was passed in 1933, and in Europe several nations,
including the ascendant Nazi Germany, pressed
4-204-932-2
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for protectionism. Many felt that those forces of
protectionism and isolationism contributed to the
catastrophe of World War II. See, e.g., Palen, “Protectionism 100 Years Ago Helped Ignite a World
War. Could It Happen Again?,” Wash. Post, June 30,
2017.
As a result, postwar U.S. policy shifted in
favor of open trade, as the U.S. took a central role
in a new global economic order. Immediately after
the war, the U.S. State Department published a
proposed charter, www.worldtradelaw.net/misc/
Suggested%20Charter.pdf, for an international
organization which eventually became the World
Trade Organization (WTO).
Government procurement was always part
of these postwar efforts to open trade. See generally
Yukins & Schooner, “Incrementalism: Eroding the
Impediments to a Global Public Procurement Market,” 38 Geo. J. Int’l L. 529 (2007), papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1002446. The proposed charter put forward by the U.S., for example,
explicitly urged that government procurement be
included in the new free trade arrangements, and
government procurement eventually became the
subject of a separate plurilateral agreement under
the WTO, which is now known as the Agreement
on Government Procurement (GPA). www.wto.
org/gpa. Members of the WTO—so far, generally
only the most highly industrialized members—
elect to join the GPA on a plurilateral basis, and
so negotiate common and bilateral market arrangements regarding procurement trade. See,
e.g., WTO, “Government Procurement Agreement:
Opening Markets and Promoting Good Governance”
(2015), www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/20y_e/
gpa_brochure2015_e.pdf; Anderson, Schooner &
Swan, “The WTO’s Revised Government Procurement Agreement—An Important Milestone Toward
Greater Market Access And Transparency In Global
Public Procurement Markets,” 54 GC ¶ 1; papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1984216.
The U.S. has also negotiated a number of
regional and bilateral free trade agreements which

¶ 308

include chapters on procurement, and bilateral free
trade agreements regarding defense (known as “reciprocal defense procurement agreements”) with its
allies. The most important regional free trade agreement for the U.S. was NAFTA, although NAFTA’s
Chapter 10, the procurement chapter, was largely
an unfinished work between the U.S., Canada and
Mexico. See Yukins, “International Protection of Free
Trade in Procurement Under NAFTA’s Chapter 10
on Public Procurement: The Pathway from NAFTA
to WTO Government Procurement Agreement to
a Potential European-US Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership,” in Transnational Law of
Public Contracts 107 (2016). The half-finished nature
of NAFTA’s procurement chapter was less important
because two of NAFTA’s parties, the U.S. and Canada,
were also members of the WTO GPA, and in recent
years all three parties looked forward to joining the
TPP.
Because NAFTA’s Chapter 10 left significant
gaps, in early 2016 Canada, Mexico and the U.S.
tentatively agreed by side letters, ustr.gov/sites/
default/files/TPP-Final-Text-Letter-Exchange-USCA-MX-re-GP-Procedures.pdf, that they would replace NAFTA Chapter 10 with a new procurement
chapter in a much broader regional trade agreement,
the TPP, which would have included many nations
around the Pacific Rim. The TPP procurement chapter was largely built on the terms of the WTO GPA.
See, e.g., Gorski, “The Impact of the TPP on Opening
Government Procurement to International Competition in the Asia-Pacific Region,” 8(2) Trade L. & Dev.
66 (2016). The TPP thus would have linked Pacific
Rim nations (many of whom, such as Malaysia and
Vietnam, are not members of the GPA) to the community of nations that have committed to open their
procurement markets under common best practices
per the GPA.
All of that changed abruptly, however, when
President Trump took office in January 2017. True
to his campaign promises, Trump canceled the U.S.’
commitment to the proposed TPP (which other Pacific
Rim nations continued to pursue, as discussed below),
and the Trump administration launched a long, bruising renegotiation of NAFTA with Canada and Mexico.
Taken in sum, the prior chain of events meant
that, if procurement were viewed in isolation, there
would be a relatively simple measure of success for
the U.S. in the renegotiation of NAFTA: would the
renegotiated agreement (what became known as the
2
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USMCA) include a procurement chapter that was
better than the terms the U.S. would have achieved
under TPP?
Assessing the Procurement Chapter in the
USMCA—Viewing the procurement provisions of
the USMCA in isolation, the answer is probably
no: taken alone, the USMCA’s procurement chapter
probably left the U.S. in a weaker position than the
TPP, because of the reduced impact and coverage of
the USMCA’s procurement chapter. That analysis is
artificial, of course, because the procurement chapter is only one of many chapters to the agreement,
and the USMCA as a whole promises the U.S. gains
in other markets, such as dairy and automobile
manufacturing. But the key features of the USMCA’s
procurement chapter, including its narrower coverage, do offer important lessons for open markets in
procurement, whether viewed regionally or globally.
In the NAFTA renegotiations, for political reasons (the imminent shift in government in Mexico
City), Mexico reached agreement first with the U.S.
The terms of the new USMCA were not publicly released, however, until Canada agreed to join the new
agreement as well. See ustr.gov/trade-agreements/
free-trade-agreements/united-states-mexico-canadaagreement. The procurement chapter in the proposed
USMCA included several important provisions, some
of which were quite surprising:
• No Canada: Probably the most startling provision was the complete omission of Canada from
the procurement provisions. Article 13.2 of the
proposed agreement excludes Canada from the
procurement chapter, and Canada has explained,
see, e.g., Government of Canada, “Summary
Backgrounder: United States - Mexico - Canada
Agreement,” international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/
agr-acc/usmca-aeumc/summary-sommaire.
aspx?lang=eng, that under the new arrangement,
with regard to procurement:
• Canada’s relationship with the U.S. will be
governed by the GPA, in which both countries are members.
• Canada’s relationship with Mexico will
be governed by the Comprehensive and
Progressive Agreement on Trans-Pacific
Partnership (CPTPP), the successor to
the TPP, which awaits ratification by the
member nations, international.gc.ca/
trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords© 2018 Thomson Reuters
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•

•

commerciaux/agr-acc/cptpp-ptpgp/index.
aspx?lang=eng.
“Strict Reciprocity” Abandoned: During the
course of the NAFTA renegotiation, a series of public reports indicated that the U.S.
might press for what some have termed
“strict” reciprocity: limiting Canadian and
Mexican vendors’ access to the U.S. federal
market, on a dollar-for-dollar basis, to that
afforded in the vendors’ home markets. See,
e.g., Rodriguez & Palmer, “Freeland Returns
to Canada Empty-Handed,” POLITICO, Sept.
21, 2018, www.politico.com/newsletters/
morning-trade/2018/09/21/freeland-returnsto-canada-empty-handed-347615. (Under this
approach, for example, if Nation X has only
$1 billion in accessible public procurement,
Nation X’s vendors will have access to only $1
billion of the $500 billion U.S. federal market.)
This type of strict reciprocity was bitterly opposed in public statements by Canadian negotiators, see, e.g., Jasso, “Canada’s Lead NAFTA
Negotiator Criticizes U.S. Proposal as Freeland
Heads to Washington,” Globe & Mail, Feb. 13,
2018, and was roundly criticized by U.S. industry, which feared that Mexican vendors would
be willing to forfeit their tenuous access to the
U.S. federal market in exchange for new, draconian limits on U.S. access to the Mexican public
markets, see, e.g., Murphy, U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, “Gutting NAFTA’s Procurement
Rules Could Cost Americans Billions” (Jan. 24,
2018), uschamber.com/series/modernizing-nafta/gutting-nafta-s-procurement-rules-couldcost-americans-billions. The final proposed text
of the USMCA did not reflect strict reciprocity
in procurement, but instead followed a more
traditional (and liberal) approach to reciprocal
market access.
Text Followed Prior International Agreements:
Although the USMCA negotiations followed on
a very public repudiation of the TPP negotiations by President Trump, as several observers
have pointed out, the broader USMCA drew
largely from the draft TPP agreement. See,
e.g., Collins, “New Trade Deal with Canada,
Mexico Borrows Heavily from Pact that Trump
Abandoned,” USA Today, Oct. 3, 2018. That
was certainly true with regard to procurement.
A close examination of the legal texts of the
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USMCA’s chapter 13 and the TPP’s chapter
15 (the government procurement chapters)
confirms the striking similarities between the
draft USMCA and the draft TPP agreement,
and as noted the draft TPP provisions were in
turn drawn from the WTO GPA.
• Coverage Not Expanded: As Jean Heilman
Grier explained in an excellent review of
the new agreement, “USMCA – Modernized
NAFTA: Procurement” (Oct. 5, 2018), trade.
djaghe.com/?p=5174, the new U.S. bilateral
arrangement with Mexico largely mirrored
longstanding NAFTA coverage, and the access allowed U.S. vendors to Canadian public
markets under the GPA may, in some cases,
be more limited than under Canada’s existing
NAFTA agreement with the U.S.
What was not surprising, however, was that the
new agreement did not give Mexico (or Canada)
broader access to U.S. subcentral (state and local)
procurement markets, which has been a recurring
demand from both Canadian and European negotiators. (The recent Comprehensive Economic and
Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada and the
European Union markedly improved Europeans’
access to Canadian local and provincial public markets, much as the Europeans afford access to their
subcentral markets as a matter of course.)
Conclusion—Despite promises by President
Trump that the new USMCA would be an important
improvement upon NAFTA, and despite obvious
gaps in the prior NAFTA regime regarding procurement, see, e.g., Yukins & Green, “International Trade
Agreements and U. S. Procurement Law” (chapter in
forthcoming volume, American Bar Association, 2018),
the USMCA—the Trump administration’s leading
achievement in trade—reflects little real change in
the trading regime regarding procurement.
The outcome of the USMCA negotiations nevertheless may offer lessons for future trade arrangements
regarding procurement. First, if what was perhaps the
most contentious trade negotiations in modern times
yielded almost no changes regarding procurement,
future trade agreements may follow the same gentle,
upward trajectory in their approach to procurement.
Trade agreements regarding procurement may, in other
words, be relatively stable and predictable.
Second, Canada’s surprising decision to abandon
the procurement chapter in the USMCA, in favor of
the GPA’s protections, highlighted another possible
3
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negotiating strategy for nations locked in broader
bilateral negotiations with the U.S.: to sever procurement from those negotiations, and instead to seek access to public procurement markets through the GPA.
A number of nations in the former Soviet bloc are
seeking to join the GPA, supported by the European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and other
nations in or near the accession process—including
China and Russia—may decide that it is simpler to
address procurement through the GPA, rather than
through bilateral negotiations with the U.S.
Finally, the provisional end of the USMCA negotiations shifts attention to other pending procurement issues. If the existing universe of procurement
agreements remains relatively intact—if the U.S.
does not withdraw from the GPA, for example—focus may shift again to the Trump administration’s
“Buy American” initiative, under which the U.S.
may impose more extreme domestic preferences
on contracts valued below the various trade agreements’ monetary thresholds. See, e.g., Yukins, “The
Trump Administration’s Policy Options in International Procurement,” 2016 West Gov. Contracts Year
in Rev. Sess. 2-I (Feb. 2017), papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2925953.
At the same time, the relative stability of the
trade agreements suggests that it may be easier
to achieve regulatory cooperation among nations
to reduce barriers to trade, as the European Union
and the U.S. now seek to do in certain industrial
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sectors, see, e.g., Cong. Res. Serv., “U.S.-EU Trade
and Economic Issues” (Aug. 1, 2018), fas.org/sgp/
crs/row/IF10931.pdf, and as the U.S. Access Board
did in procurement when it adopted truly “global”
information technology accessibility standards
under Section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act, in cooperation with the European Commission, see, e.g.,
U.S. Architectural and Transportation Compliance
Board, “Board and European Commission Cooperation Recognized at International Forum,” 22
Access Currents 1 (2016) (available on Westlaw).
Because tensions may rise in other areas, such as
a new protectionism in European defense markets,
see, e.g., Yukins, “European Commission Proposes
Expanding The European Defence Fund—A Major
Potential Barrier To Transatlantic Defense Procurement,” 60 GC ¶ 196, the relative stability in
procurement agreements that the USMCA seemed
to confirm is a welcome sign for the international
procurement community.
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